Judge Leonie Brinkema, who earlier this year found Google guilty of illegally monopolizing parts of the digital advertising infrastructure, has made clear she’d rather the parties settle than force her to pick a remedy — a signal of how difficult it may be to untangle Google’s ad stack. The Department of Justice is pressing for structural fixes: selling off Google’s AdX exchange, opening the auction logic inside its ad server (DFP), and prohibiting self-favoring behavior in ad auctions; Google counters with behavioral interventions and expanded interoperability, arguing structural remedy risks disruption. Brinkema, while acknowledging the complexity, has warned against superficial “window dressing” in the arguments and pushed both sides to provide concrete paths forward. How she balances the technical feasibility, market harm, and legal precedent could become a blueprint for future Big Tech antitrust fights.
Sources: AdexChanger, Reuters
Key Takeaways
– Judge Brinkema seems reluctant to impose a breakup, signaling she’d prefer the parties reach a settlement over her having to engineer a structural remedy.
– The DOJ is pushing for hard structural fixes — notably divesting AdX, open-sourcing auction logic, prohibiting self-preferencing in ad auctions — while Google is countering with behavioral and interoperability proposals.
– The trial outcomes in this case could set a legal and technical precedent for how courts remedy monopolistic behavior in high-tech markets, influencing future antitrust enforcement in the digital economy.
In-Depth
The clash between Google and the Justice Department has moved from proving wrongdoing to figuring out what comes next. In April 2025, Judge Brinkema found that Google had unlawfully monopolized parts of the ad tech sector by tying together its publisher ad server (DFP) and its ad exchange (AdX), thereby locking out competitors and disadvantaging publishers. The current phase is all about remedies — how to dismantle or constrain the harm without creating bigger chaos in the digital ads ecosystem.
From the government’s perspective, the only way to restore competitive balance is through structural change. The DOJ’s proposals include forcing Google to divest AdX, separating or open-sourcing the logic inside DFP (so rivals could properly interoperate), and banning preferential auction practices like first look or last look for Google’s own tools. The DOJ even wants a path to require full divestiture of DFP if these fixes fail to restore competition. In its view, structural remedies are the only way to prevent continued dominance and to recalibrate power in the market.
Google pushes back hard, arguing that such structural changes would be disruptive to publishers, advertisers, and to the open web generally. Its counterproposal leans on interoperability and behavioral fixes: allow rival systems to plug into Google’s platform on fair terms, make bidding and auction processes more transparent, drop certain auction rules that give Google an unfair edge, and commit to new constraints on how it treats third-party technology. Google insists this path both addresses Brinkema’s liability findings and preserves stability.
Judge Brinkema, however, has made it clear that mere rhetoric isn’t enough: she’s pressed both sides to move beyond posturing and show real, workable designs. On the defense side, she warned against “window dressing” — shallow solutions that sound nice but don’t solve underlying structural lock-ins. She’s asked for input from technical insiders and experts, not just high-level legal arguments. In particular, she’s focused on whether the technical disentangling of AdX from DFP is feasible without collapsing performance, security, or functionality.
The stakes are high. If she opts for structural relief, it would mark one of the most sweeping antitrust remedies in tech in years, and could embolden further breakups in Amazon, Apple, Meta, and other parts of Big Tech. If she goes with behavior- or interoperability-based fixes, those may struggle to truly counteract entrenched dominance. Her judgment will need to thread a delicate line: restoring competition while preserving the machinery of the modern internet.
In many ways, this moment is a turning point for antitrust in the digital age — one where courts must not only detect monopoly power but also unweave sophisticated technical systems that have coevolved under dominant players. The remedy she selects may echo across future antitrust battles, shaping not only how tech giants are regulated, but how courts think about fixing digital markets.

