A massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that peaked at 1.5 billion packets per second (pps) was detected and successfully mitigated by security firm FastNetMon, targeting a DDoS scrubbing/mitigation vendor in Western Europe. The flood was primarily a UDP flood, sourced from compromised customer-premises equipment (CPE) including Internet of Things (IoT) devices and MikroTik routers, spread across more than 11,000 unique networks globally. FastNetMon warned that as these kinds of packet-rate attacks grow, ISP-level filtering of outgoing traffic will be essential to prevent future large-scale flooding attacks from overwhelming infrastructure.
Sources: TechRadar, FastNetMon.com
Key Takeaways
– Explosive packet rate is now as much a concern as bandwidth volume. While many past DDoS attacks have focused on gigabits or terabits per second, this attack’s sheer packet-per-second (pps) rate stresses network infrastructure differently, particularly the capacity of routers, firewalls, and scrubbing systems to handle huge numbers of discrete packets.
– IoT devices and consumer routers remain major weak links. The attack leveraged hijacked IoT gear and MikroTik routers—everyday devices often with lax security—that together served as the army used to generate the flood. Mitigating these risks requires better device security, firmware patching, and responsible deployment by manufacturers and users.
– Proactive defense at the ISP level is now critical. Because attacks of this scale (in terms of packet count and distributed sources) can quickly saturate network-edge devices, the role of ISPs in detecting and filtering malicious outgoing traffic becomes indispensable. Without that layer, even well-protected targets can be stressed by the cumulative effect of massive distributed sources.
In-Depth
Over the past few days, the security community has been alerted to a staggering new example of what modern DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks can look like—and it’s not just about raw data volumes anymore. The attack, observed by FastNetMon and detailed in a TechRadar article and FastNetMon’s own press release, reached about 1.5 billion packets per second (pps). What makes that number so meaningful is not merely its size but what it tests: the capacity of equipment across networks to examine, route, filter, and block large numbers of small, often malicious, data packets.
The source of the attack is as predictable as it is troubling: compromised consumer-grade equipment. Specifically, IoT devices and MikroTik routers formed much of the botnet, deployed across more than 11,000 separate networks globally. These devices are often poorly secured, rarely checked or updated, and widely distributed—making them a go-to resource for attackers who wish to build up enormous attack surfaces without needing infrastructure of their own.
The target was a DDoS scrubbing provider, a service whose job is literally to filter incoming traffic for malicious patterns and block them, letting legitimate traffic through. That such a service was itself the target highlights two things: one, that attackers are increasingly aiming for defenders, not just businesses directly, and two, that the defenses need to be strong, scalable, and fast. FastNetMon claims to have detected the attack in real time and mitigated it using a combination of scrubbing tools plus access-control lists (ACLs) on edge routers that are known to be potential amplification sources.
One of the key warnings from this incident is that enterprises and mitigation services alone are not enough. Because attack sources are so distributed, filtering needs to happen upstream—at ISPs—and ideally at multiple chokepoints. Without that, even well-defended sites can suffer collateral damage, or see degraded performance during large attacks. This is especially important because packet floods strain not only bandwidth but also the processing power needed for packet inspection, firewall rules, and upstream routing devices.
Looking forward, several implications stand out. Manufacturers of IoT and consumer router devices need to prioritize security: secure defaults, regular firmware updates, simpler patch deployment to end users, etc. Network operators and ISPs should invest in better real-time detection systems and filtering infrastructure that can respond to high pps attacks. And policymakers or regulatory bodies might consider standards or requirements for device security and for ISPs to offer or enforce filtering of malicious traffic. All told, this incident underscores not just the increasing scale of attacks, but the shifting shape of how they are mounted—and what kind of defenses are required to counter them.